Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival?
Presidential legislative majorities under bicameral congresses have seldom been considered in the literature on coalition cabinets. However, this combination is far from being an isolated or irrelevant topic. Bicameral congresses comprise a double round of negotiation for the executive, increasing t...
| Autor principal: | Albala, Adrián |
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| Outros Autores: | Tribunal Superior Eleitoral |
| Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | English |
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2018
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oai:bdjur.stj.jus.br.teste5:oai:localhost:bdtse-42672020-06-02 Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? Albala, Adrián Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Presidencialismo Democracia Poder Executivo Poder Legislativo Democracia Coalizão Governo Presidential legislative majorities under bicameral congresses have seldom been considered in the literature on coalition cabinets. However, this combination is far from being an isolated or irrelevant topic. Bicameral congresses comprise a double round of negotiation for the executive, increasing the shadow of the unexpected. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for a president to guarantee the approval of policies. In this case, what if a government does not control both houses? How are coalition cabinets affected by the non-control of one or both chambers? I will focus analysis on the 25 cases of coalition cabinets in Latin America since the return of democracy and present a bicameral framework. Through mvQCA, I find that, contrary to common belief, the controlling of a bicameral majority is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure stable coalitions. 2018-02-07T19:39:23Z 2018-02-07T19:39:23Z 2017 Artigo ALBALA, Adrián. Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses: how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? Brazilian Political Science Review, São Paulo, v. 11, n. 2, p. 1-27, 2017. http://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/handle/bdtse/4267 en <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.pt_BR"><img alt="Licença Creative Commons" style="border-width:0" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-sa/4.0/88x31.png" /></a><br />Este item está licenciado com uma Licença <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.pt_BR">Creative Commons Atribuição-CompartilhaIgual 4.0 Internacional</a>. 27 p. |
| institution |
TSE |
| collection |
TSE |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Presidencialismo Democracia Poder Executivo Poder Legislativo Democracia Coalizão Governo |
| spellingShingle |
Presidencialismo Democracia Poder Executivo Poder Legislativo Democracia Coalizão Governo Albala, Adrián Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| description |
Presidential legislative majorities under bicameral congresses have seldom been considered in the literature on coalition cabinets. However, this combination is far from being an isolated or irrelevant topic. Bicameral congresses comprise a double round of negotiation for the executive, increasing the shadow of the unexpected. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for a president to guarantee the approval of policies. In this case, what if a government does not control both houses? How are coalition cabinets affected by the non-control of one or both chambers? I will focus analysis on the 25 cases of coalition cabinets in Latin America since the return of democracy and present a bicameral framework. Through mvQCA, I find that, contrary to common belief, the controlling of a bicameral majority is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure stable coalitions. |
| author2 |
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral |
| format |
Artigo |
| author |
Albala, Adrián |
| title |
Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| title_short |
Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| title_full |
Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| title_fullStr |
Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| title_sort |
coalition presidentialism in bicameral congresses : how does the control of a bicameral majority affect coalition survival? |
| publishDate |
2018 |
| url |
http://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/handle/bdtse/4267 |
| _version_ |
1806195491319316480 |
| score |
12,587216 |