How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence
It provides some of the first evidence of the strength and contingency of policy feedback effects in developing democracies. In contexts where clientelist practices are common, convincing vulnerable voters to reject clientelist candidates depends on creating 'collective confidence' that en...
| Autor principal: | Phillips, Jonathan |
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| Outros Autores: | Tribunal Superior Eleitoral |
| Tipo de documento: | Outro |
| Idioma: | English |
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2020
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oai:bdjur.stj.jus.br.teste5:oai:localhost:bdtse-66522020-06-02 How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence Phillips, Jonathan Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Política social Democracia Clientelismo Bolsa família It provides some of the first evidence of the strength and contingency of policy feedback effects in developing democracies. In contexts where clientelist practices are common, convincing vulnerable voters to reject clientelist candidates depends on creating 'collective confidence' that enough other voters will also reject those candidates. A targeted household survey in Northeast Brazil provide evidence that programmatic social policy can help coordinate voting behaviour expectations among voters, reducing collective vulnerability and suppressing the demand for clientelism. Leveraging plausibly exogenous variation between Bolsa Família recipients and those who have been approved for the same benefits but remain on the waiting list, the evidence suggests recipients are markedly more likely to reject hypothetical vote-buying offers. To confirm the mechanism, a novel application of a conjoint survey experiment suggests that social policy receipt raises confidence in other recipients' willingness to reject clientelism, helping resolve an important collective action problem. Consistent with the theory, these effects and mechanisms are strongest in states where clientelism is most widespread, and absent in states where local programmatic reform has been deepest. 2020-05-07T17:18:44Z 2020-05-07T17:18:44Z 2018 Outro PHILLIPS, Jonathan. How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism: Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence. In: ENCONTRO DA ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA, 11., 2018, Curitiba. Anais eletrônicos [...]. Rio de Janeiro: ABCP, 2018. p. 1-22. http://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/handle/bdtse/6652 en <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.pt_BR"><img alt="Licença Creative Commons" style="border-width:0" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-nd/4.0/88x31.png" /></a><br />Este item está licenciado com uma Licença <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.pt_BR">Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0 Internacional</a>. 22 p. |
| institution |
TSE |
| collection |
TSE |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Política social Democracia Clientelismo Bolsa família |
| spellingShingle |
Política social Democracia Clientelismo Bolsa família Phillips, Jonathan How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| description |
It provides some of the first evidence of the strength and contingency of policy feedback effects in developing democracies. In contexts where clientelist practices are common,
convincing vulnerable voters to reject clientelist candidates depends on creating 'collective
confidence' that enough other voters will also reject those candidates. A targeted household
survey in Northeast Brazil provide evidence that programmatic social policy can help coordinate
voting behaviour expectations among voters, reducing collective vulnerability and suppressing
the demand for clientelism. Leveraging plausibly exogenous variation between Bolsa Família
recipients and those who have been approved for the same benefits but remain on the waiting
list, the evidence suggests recipients are markedly more likely to reject hypothetical vote-buying offers. To confirm the mechanism, a novel application of a conjoint survey experiment suggests that social policy receipt raises confidence in other recipients' willingness to reject clientelism,
helping resolve an important collective action problem. Consistent with the theory, these effects and mechanisms are strongest in states where clientelism is most widespread, and absent in states where local programmatic reform has been deepest. |
| author2 |
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral |
| format |
Outro |
| author |
Phillips, Jonathan |
| title |
How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| title_short |
How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| title_full |
How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| title_fullStr |
How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| title_full_unstemmed |
How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| title_sort |
how social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : bolsa família, policy feedback and collective confidence |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| url |
http://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/handle/bdtse/6652 |
| _version_ |
1806195611326742528 |
| score |
12,587216 |